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Johnson: Johnson: FAA Pre-Emption: When Should Conflicting State Law Be Pre-Empted by the FAA

FAA Pre-emption: When Should
Conflicting State Law Be Pre-empted
by the FAA?
Weston Securities Corp. v. Aykanian'

I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Arbitration Act ("F.A.A.") was created by Congress to alleviate the
judicial system's historical hostility toward arbitration.2 To promote arbitration as
a means of alternative dispute resolution, Congress included section 2 of the F.A.A., 3
which "declared a policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states
to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties
agreed to resolve by arbitration."4
Since the creation of the F.A.A., courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, have considered whether the F.A.A. pre-empts conflicting state law.
Although courts generally find that the F.A.A. pre-empts state substantive and
procedural law when it stands as an obstacle to Congress' goal of enforcing
arbitration,5 the Massachusetts Court of Appeals, in Weston Securities Corp. v.
Aykanian, made its own determination on this issue, since it was a case of first
impression for the court. The court faced the question of whether a Massachusetts
procedural rule, which did not allow an immediate appeal from an order to arbitrate,
was pre-empted by the F.A.A. The court's holding expanded the federal policy
favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements in Massachusetts by upholding a
state procedural rule that promoted arbitration agreements by disallowing certain
judicial appeals. The court, therefore, held that the rule was not pre-empted by the
F.A.A., even though it contradicted the F.A.A.'s corresponding rule.

1. 703 N.E.2d 1185 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
2. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985).
3. Section 2 states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
4. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
5. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477
(1988). The Supreme Court stated in this case that state law may "be pre-empted to the extent it actually
conflicts with federal law-that is, to the extent that it 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1940) (citing Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912))).
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Weston Securities Corporation, Douglas A. Biggar, I. Richard Horowitz, and
Joseph Robbat, Jr. are the plaintiffs in this suit. Weston Securities Corporation is a
member of the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"). 6 Horowitz and
Biggar were registered principals of Weston Securities Corporation, and Robatt was
a registered representative All the plaintiffs signed a Uniform Application for
Securities Registration or Transfer Form ("U-4 Form") that stated that they would
agree to arbitrate any disputes that were required to be arbitrated under the "NASD
Code of Arbitration Procedure" ("NASD Code").'
In 1994, the defendants, Ara Aykanian and others, 9 claimed that the plaintiffs
had "violated various Federal and State statutes, breached its fiduciary duties to the
The
defendants, and concealed and misrepresented certain material facts."'
defendants each filed a "Uniform Submission Agreement" for arbitration with the
NASD, which bound them to arbitrate all claims they had against Weston." Weston
claimed, however, that the defendants' claims were either barred by the six-year rule
in the NASD Code,'" or else, not arbitrable under the NASD Code.'" Accordingly,
Weston refused to adhere to the Uniform Submission Agreements. 4
In April of 1995, Weston called upon the NASD's Director of Arbitration
("director") to dismiss the defendants' arbitration claim.'" Nevertheless, in October
of 1995, the director stated that the defendants had standing to compel arbitration
because they were "public customers of Weston.' 6 The director then referred the
defendants' claims that arose after June 16, 1988 to a panel of arbitrators. Before
the arbitration panel considered the claims, the plaintiffs sued in the superior court
to enjoin the defendants' ability to proceed with arbitration.'"
In June 1996, a superior court judge issued a preliminary injunction against the
defendants. The injunction enjoined the defendants from proceeding with the
arbitration.'9 The judge also ordered submission of cross motions for summary
judgment by both parties.20 Weston's motion for summary judgment was denied and

6. Weston Sec. Corp. v. Aykanian, 703 N.E.2d 1185, 1187 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
Collectively the plaintiffs are called "Weston."
7. Id.
8. Id. Weston, under section 12(a) of the NASD Code, is required to "arbitrate any
'dispute, claim or controversy ... between a customer and a member and/or associated person arising
in connection with the business of such member or in connection with the activities of such associated
persons ... upon the demand of the customer."'
9. They were customers of Weston.
10. Weston, 703 N.E.2d at 1187 n.3.
11. Id. at 1187.
12. Id. Section 15 of the NASD Code states that arbitration shall not be available where
six years have lapsed from the event causing the claim.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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the defendants' motion was allowed.2 The judge then entered an order compelling
Weston to commence arbitration before the NASD.22 Weston filed an appeal from
the superior judge's order and a motion to stay arbitration pending appeal.' The
plaintiffs' motion to stay was denied and its appeal from the denial of
2 4 its motion was
consolidated with its appeal from the order compelling arbitration.
In their appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the Massachusetts Uniform Arbitration
Act, which does not permit an immediate appeal from an order compelling
arbitration, was pre-empted by the F.A.A., which does permit such an appeal." The
Massachusetts Court of Appeals held that state procedural law is pre-empted by the
F.A.A. only "to the extent that it is contrary to Congress' purpose in enacting the
F.A.A., which is to enforce arbitration agreements. 26 The appeal was dismissed
because the court found that the Massachusetts rule promotes enforcement of
arbitration agreements by not permitting an immediate appeal from an order
compelling arbitration, notwithstanding the F.A.A.'s provision allowing the appeal.27

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The F.A.A. was enacted in 1925 to "overrule the judiciary's longstanding
refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate., 2' Before this time, courts refused to
enforce arbitration agreements, 9 clinging to ancient notions of judicial province
originating in England when the courts "opposed anything that would altogether
deprive every one of them ofjurisdiction."30 In fact, the incentive for Congress to
enact the F.A.A. was its desire to change the courts' "antiarbitration [sic] rule."'"
The F.A.A. foresaw the potential confrontation of the F.A.A. and conflicting state
law and, therefore, established federal substantive law, which applied in both state
and federal courts 2 pursuant to Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause to
enact substantive rules of law.33 Thus, the F.A.A. is applicable to any transaction
involving interstate commerce.34
Since the enactment of the F.A.A., courts have decided whether the Act preempts state substantive and procedural law that is contrary to the Act. A line of

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1187-88.
26. Id. at 1188.
27. Id. at 1192.
28. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985).
29. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,270 (1995) (citing Volt Info. Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)).
30. Id. (quoting Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 211 n.5
(1956) (quoting United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222
F. 1006, 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (quoting Scott v. Avery, 5 H.L. Cas. 811 (1856)))).
31. Id. at 270-71 (citing Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 220).
32. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).
33. Id. at 10.
34. M & L Power Serv., Inc. v. American Networks Int'l, 44 F. Supp.2d 134, 140 (D.R.I. 1999) (citing
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994)).
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federal and state cases have considered this very issue, and have consistently
recognized the F.A.A.'s goal to promote enforcement of arbitration agreements by
stating that state substantive law will be pre-empted by the F.A.A. when it is contrary
to the F.A.A.'s purpose," and that state procedural law will be pre-empted when the
state procedures serve to defeat the substantive right to arbitration granted under the
F.A.A.36
In Hines v. Davidowitz," the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue
of pre-emption, however, it did not specifically consider F.A.A. pre-emption. Later
courts, though, looked to the language of the F.A.A. when dealing with the issue of
F.A.A. pre-emption.3" In Hines, the Court decided whether Pennsylvania's Alien
Registration Act "encroached upon legislative powers constitutionally vested inthe
federal government" in view of the Federal Alien Registration Act, and if equal
protection of the laws was denied by the Pennsylvania Act.39 Its analysis discussed
the power of both state and national governments.4 In determining whether the state
law was valid in light of the federal law created by Congress, the Court stated "there
is not--and from the very nature of the problem there cannot be--any rigid formula
or rule which can be used as a universal pattern to determine the meaning and
purpose of every act of Congress.'
It then looked to Savage v. Jones42 for help in discovering a manner of
determination.43 Specifically, Savage stated that if the purpose of the federal act in
question cannot be accomplished or is frustrated by the state law, "the state law must
yield to the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its delegated power."" In
light of Savage, the Hines Court stated that its job was to decide whether the law of
Pennsylvania stood as an "obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."43 The Court concluded that Congress'
purpose in enacting the Federal Alien Registration Act was the creation of a
"uniform national registration system" and, therefore, the Pennsylvania Act could
not be enforced46 since it would stand as an obstacle to such a system.
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,47 the
Supreme Court not only dealt with the pre-emption issue as it did in Hines, it
specifically dealt with F.A.A. pre-emption. The case involved a dispute between
Moses H. Cone Hospital ("Hospital") and the defendant Mercury Construction

35. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
477 (1988) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1940)).
36. Duggan v. Zip Mail Serv., Inc., 920 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Greenwood
v.Sherfield, 895 S.W.2d 169, 172-73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)).
37. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
38. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468
(1988); Weston Sec. Corp. v. Aykanian, 703 N.E.2d 1185 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
39. Hines, 312 U.S. at 59-60.
40. Id. at 62.
41. Id. at 67.
42. 225 U.S. 501 (1912).
43. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
44. Savage, 225 U.S. at 533.
45. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67 (citing Savage, 225 U.S. at 533).
46. d. at 74.
47. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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Corporation ("Mercury"), which it hired to construct additions to the hospital. 48 In
its analysis of whether the dispute between the parties was arbitrable, the Court
adhered to the proposition that the F.A.A. pre-empts state law, as it declared that any
written arbitration agreement "in any maritime transaction of a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or equity for the revocation of any
contract." 49 It further stated, "[s]ection 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive
or procedural policies to the contrary."50 Hence, the Court said that the section
effectively creates "a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to
any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act."'" It agreed with
numerous courts of appeals, which consistently stated that "questions of arbitrability
must be addressed with a healthy regard for federal policy favoring arbitration." 52
In 1984, the Supreme Court continued to adhere to a policy favoring arbitration
when it was again presented with the F.A.A. pre-emption issue. In Southland Corp.
v. Keating,5 3 the Court decided whether a California statute, which did not allow the
arbitration of suits brought under its law, could invalidate a contract which called for
arbitration under the F.A.Ai- It concluded that the F.A.A.'s authority comes from
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, which allows it to enact substantive
rules. 5' The Court stated that it was implicit in the F.A.A.'s power stemming from
the Commerce Clause that the F.A.A. should apply in both federal and state courts. 56
It also noted that the Moses decision "reaffirmed" its stance on the scope of the
substantive federal arbitration law--that it applied to both federal and state courts.57
The Court reasoned that Congress would not want the validity of arbitration
provisions to reach different outcomes depending on whether the case was tried in
federal or state court.5 The Court, therefore, held that the F.A.A.'s substantive law
pre-empts conflicting state law, and that state statutes that were anti-arbitration could
not be used to defeat the goals of the F.A.A. 59
Two years later, the Supreme Court was again presented with the F.A.A. preemption issue. In Perry v. Thomas,60the Court decided whether the F.A.A.'s policy
of mandatory enforcement of agreements to arbitrate pre-empted a California labor

48. Id. at 5. Mercury entered into a contract with the Hospital which stated that "disputes involving
interpretation of the contract or performance of the construction work were to be referred in the first
instance to J.N. Pease Associates, an independent architectural firm hired by the Hospital to design and
oversee the construction project." However, with only a few exceptions, any dispute, regardless of
whether it was decided by the architectural firm, could be submitted to binding arbitration by either party
under an arbitration clause within the contract. Id. at 4-5.
49. Id. at 24 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994)).
50. Id. at 24.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 24-25.
53. 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).
54. Id. at 6.
55. Id. at 11.
56. Id. at 12.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 15-16.
59. Id.

60. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
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statute that provided for a judicial forum for collection of wages actions irrespective
of any contract to arbitrate.6' The petitioners sought arbitration under sections 2 and
4 of the F.A.A. 62 Their demand for arbitration stemmed from an arbitration
provision in a U-4 Form that the defendants had signed.63 The defendant opposed
arbitration because section 299 of the California Labor Code mandated a judicial
forum for his case. The Supreme Court looked to Moses which stated that section
2 of the F.A.A. creates substantive law that is applicable to any agreement to
arbitrate that comes within the domain of the F.A.A.6 It found in favor of arbitration
by looking to Keating, which stated that "Congress intended to foreclose state
legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements., 61 It
further stated that Congress' federal policy favoring arbitration took away state's
power to require the judicial hearing of a case when the parties had contracted to
arbitrate.66 The parties clearly contracted to arbitrate, bringing their agreement
within the coverage of the F.A.A.67 It was also clear that the federal policy of the
F.A.A. was in conflict with section 229 of the California Code that required litigants
to resolve wage disputes in court and, therefore, the F.A.A. pre-empted the state
statute under the Supremacy Clause.68 This outcome revealed that the Supreme
Court would continue to stand firmly behind its pro-arbitration policy by striking
down state law that was contrary to such policy.
The F.A.A. pre-emption issue surfaced again in Volt Information Sciences, Inc.
v. Boardof Trustees of Leland StanfordJunior University.69 This time the Supreme
Court decided whether state procedural law contrary to the F.A.A.'s policy applied
if the parties contracted to have a certain state law apply to their contract.70 The
Court found that the state law would not be pre-empted since the parties agreed in
their contract to strictly be governed by a specific state law.7 In its analysis, the
Court first looked to Hines, concluding that although the F.A.A. did not pre-empt
state regulation of arbitration agreements, state law would have to be pre-empted in
one instance?' This instance, the Court stated, occurred when state law ran contrary
to the federal policy of enforcing arbitration agreements and, therefore, was in
conflict with federal law.73 It recognized its long-standing adherence to finding that
the F.A.A. pre-empts state laws requiring "a judicial forum for the resolution of

61. Id. at 484.
62. Id. at 485. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) and 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994) (allowing a party to petition a United
States district court for an order to arbitrate when the other party to its arbitration agreement refuses to
arbitrate).
63. Perry, 482 U.S. at 485. The provision stated, "I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or
controversy that may arise between me and my firm, or a customer, or any other person, that is required
to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or by-laws of the organizations with which I register ..

Id.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 489 (citing Moses, 460 U.S. at 24).
Id. (quoting Keating,465 U.S. at 16).
Id. (citing Keating, 465 U.S. at 10).
Id. at 483.
Id. at 491.
489 U.S. 468 (1989).
Id. at 470.
Id. at 477.
Id. (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).
Id. (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1999/iss2/4

6

Johnson: Johnson: FAA Pre-Emption: When Should Conflicting State Law Be Pre-Empted by the FAA
FAA Pre-emption
1999]
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration." 74 It noted that
the F.A.A. does not prevent the enforcement of arbitration agreements made under
rules that are not within the F.A.A., as such a rule would run contrary to the F.A.A.'s
"primary purpose of ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate are enforce
according to their terms. ' 75 The Court followed that the parties to arbitration
agreements have free reign in structuring the agreements, such as by limiting the
disputes that can be arbitrated.76 It stated that as in the case before them where the
parties had agreed that state rules of arbitration would govern, enforcing the rules in
accordance with the agreement would be consistent with the F.A.A.'s goals, even
though by doing so the arbitration would be stayed rather than going forward as it
would under the F.A.A.77 The Court summed up its ruling by stating that by
permitting courts to enforce arbitration agreements rigorously in accordance with
their terms,78 it "give[s] effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the
parties, without doing violence to the policies behind by the F.A.A." 79
Other courts have also followed the Supreme Court's ruling that state
substantive law contrary to the F.A.A. will pre-empt the F.A.A. However, these
courts have also helped further establish when a state's procedural rule will pre-empt
the F.A.A. The Missouri Court of Appeals stated in Duggan v. Zip Mail Services,
Inc.,'° that the F.A.A. is applicable when a contract involves commerce.8 ' It asserted
that Missouri courts "are not bound by the procedural provisions of the F.A.A. and
state procedural rules may be applied when arbitration is pursuant to the F.A.A. 82
The court further stated that "state procedures may not be applied to defeat the
substantive rights granted by the F.A.A." 3 However, in determining whether the
Missouri act which dealt with arbitration would be pre-empted by the F.A.A. it stated
that applying the Missouri act would "defeat arbitration in instances where the
F.A.A. permits it" and thus "would place the state act above the federal act, violating
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 8.4 It then concluded by looking to
the Missouri Supreme Court's precedent, that the Missouri act could not be used to
render ineffective an arbitration provision that is covered by the F.A.A.85
This interpretation of state's rights under the F.A.A. was further delineated in
Reis v. Peabody Coal Co.16 In this case, the Missouri Court of Appeals found that
though the F.A.A. created substantive rights for the state courts to enforce, the
Missouri courts were not bound by F.A.A. procedural provisions, provided that the

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 478 (quoting Keating,465 U.S. at 10).
Id. at 479.
Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
Id.
Id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
Id.
920 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 202 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970)).
Id. at 203 (citing Greenwood v. Sherfield, 895 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)).
Id. (citing Greenwood, 895 S.W.2d at 172-73).
Id.
Id.
935 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
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Missouri procedural rules did not "defeat the [substantive] rights granted by
Congress.""7
Missouri's view of the F.A.A.'s procedural pre-emption was echoed by the
Supreme Court of North Dakota in Superpumper,Inc. v. Nerland Oil, Inc."5 This
court asserted that the F.A.A.'s objectives and purposes 9 are effected through its
substantive provisions, 9° and thus "a state is not obligated to altogether ignore its
own procedural requirements in light of the procedural aspects of the F.A.A.,
provided the state-enacted procedure does not defeat the rights granted by
Congress." 91 To the extent that a state enacted uniform arbitration act "impedes the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of the F.A.A., the
U.A.A. is pre-empted by federal law." 92
The Oregon Court of Appeals in Marr v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham and Co.,
Inc.93 was presented with the pre-emption question in the case of an appeal from an
order of arbitration. The court's analysis revealed the interweaving of the F.A.A.'s
pre-emption of state procedural and substantive law. The court stated that federal
law pre-empts conflicting state law that affects the party's substantive rights for
arbitration.' Thus, pre-emption occurs when it conflicts with the Congress' goal of
enforcing arbitration agreements. The court further stated that when the question is
purely procedural, "the forum state is free to apply its own law."9" However, the
court noted that a state's procedural law could not be applied if it limits the rights of
the party's federal claim, although the claim is asserted in state court.9 Therefore,
the court determined whether applying Oregon law, which did not allow appeal from
an order to arbitrate, would deny the party a federal substantive right.9 7 It held that
the timing of the right to appeal is purely procedural and that the party's substantive
right would not be denied because it could appeal after the arbitration award was
made. 98 Hence, the Oregon court was permitted to apply its own procedural law
since it did not deny a substantive right of the party in that it allowed the party to
have the right to appeal when the arbitration award judgment was entered in the state
proceeding. 99
It is clear that the F.A.A. has presented many courts with the pre-emption
question. In the instant case, however, the pre-emption question was one of first
impression for the Massachusetts Court of Appeals.

87. Id. at 630 (citing McClellan v. Barrath Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)).
88. 582 N.W.2d 647 (N.D. 1998).
89. The F.A.A.'s "purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements
that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts." Id. at 650 (citing Gilmer v.
Insterstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)).
90. Id. at 651 (citing Reis, 935 S.W.2d at 630).
91. Id. (citing Reis, 935 S.W.2d at 630).
92. Id. (citing Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc. v. Luckie, 647 N.E.2d 1308, 1314 (N.Y.
1995)).
93. 842 P.2d 801 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
94. Id. at 803.
95. Id. (citing Nutbrown v. Munn, 811 P.2d 131 (Or. 1991)).
96. Id. (citing Rogers v. Saylor, 760 P.2d 232 (Or. 1988)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 804.
99. Id.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Massachusetts Court of Appeals looked to the purpose of the F.A.A. to
decide the question of whether section 18 of the Massachusetts procedural rule
denying Weston the ability to immediately appeal an order compelling it to arbitrate
was contrary to the Federal goal of encouraging enforcement of arbitration.'o It first
noted that the F.A.A. was enacted "to overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal
to enforce agreements to arbitrate."' 0 ' The F.A.A. created a staunch federal policy
that favored arbitration by building a large body of federal substantive law
"applicable in [s]tate and [flederal [c]ourts.' ' 2
The court then looked to the fact that the F.A.A. does not expressly contain a
pre-emptive provision and that the state and federal courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to enforce the Arbitration Act.'0 3 It looked to Hines and concluded that
the F.A.A. pre-empts state law only when it is an obstacle to Congress accomplishing
its objectives." 4 The court, by further looking to Hines and Volt, found that the case
law established that states may usually establish procedural rules for dealing with the
arbitration process because federal policy does not require arbitration to be done
under a "certain set of procedural rules."' ' The only way that the state's procedural
rules would be pre-empted by the F.A.A. is if the effect of the rule was contrary to
the "goals and policies of the F.A.A.," which is to encourage the enforcement of
arbitration agreements."
In the spirit of Volt, the appellate court determined that the right to appeal from
a court's order that compels arbitration is not a substantive right, but rather a
procedural right."07 It then stated that Weston's substantive rights would not be
affected by its inability to immediately appeal the order compelling it to arbitrate, as
it would eventually be able to appeal the defendant's application to confirm their
award.'08 The court's holding was in line with the rule stated in Marr,Superpumper,
Duggan, and Reis, which is that a state's procedural rule will not be pre-empted by
the F.A.A., unless the procedure is contrary to the substantive rights granted by the
F.A.A.' 0 9 Hence, the court stated that since Weston's substantive rights were
preserved by the Massachusetts' procedural rule, the rule did not undermine the
of agreements to arbitrate, and the rule was
Federal goal encouraging enforcement
0
not pre-empted by the F.A.A.

100. Weston Sec. Corp. v. Aykanian, 703 N.E.2d 1185, 1188 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
101. Id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). See also Volt Info. Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,477 (1988).
105. Weston, 703 N.E.2d at 1188 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 476).
106. Id. (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 477-78).
107. Id. at 1189.
108. Id. Massachusetts law allows a party to appeal an unfavorable arbitration
award confirmed by a superior court. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 251, § 18(a)(3) (1988).
109. Weston, 703 N.E.2d at 1189.
110. Id.
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Although Weston was a case of first impression for the Appeals Court of
Massachusetts, the question before it had been presented to many other courts. The
court correctly held that state procedural rules are only pre-empted by the F.A.A.
when they defeat the substantive rights granted by Congress in the F.A.A."' Its
decision is consistent with those of other state courts and the United States Supreme
Court.
The precedent this decision establishes in Massachusetts will serve to further
expand the federal policy of encouraging arbitration where the parties have agreed
to arbitrate. Not only is the court's opinion consistent with the underlying policy
considerations of the F.A.A., as stated before, it is also in line with the precedent
established by other courts which have dealt with the pre-emption issue.
Congress' enactment of the F.A.A. created a strong federal policy in favor of
arbitration. Since the creation of the F.A.A., almost all states have "passed modem
arbitration statutes that adopt the F.A.A.'s underlying policy of promoting and
enforcing arbitration agreements ....,, I2 However, even though only Mississippi,14
3
Alabama, and Nebraska" cling to the "common law hostility toward arbitration,,,
by only enforcing arbitration agreements when the F.A.A. applies,"' there still exists
conflict between state and federal arbitration laws in the states that have embraced
the F.A.A.'s policy of encouraging arbitration. The instant case is an example of a
state which is not anti-arbitration, but which has a procedural rule in conflict with
the F.A.A. The procedural rule, though in direct conflict with the F.A.A. procedural
rule, did not defeat the substantive rights found in the F.A.A. The court, therefore,
refused to hold that the F.A.A. pre-empted the state rule. Though the Massachusetts
rule did not allow "an immediate appeal from the judge's order compelling it to
arbitrate" the court found that this rule was a purely procedural rule and the timing
of the right to appeal neither affected the substantive right of the defendants to
enforce the arbitration agreement, nor Weston's right not to be bound by an illegal
award." 6 Thus, in effect, the court's decision denying F.A.A. pre-emption of the
state law rule showed its adherence to the federal policy of enforcing arbitration
agreements.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that allowing a party who
contracted to arbitrate to avoid it by being allowed to bring his claim in a judicial
forum "could lead to prolonged litigation, one of the very risks the parties, by
contracting for arbitration, sought to eliminate...'. The decision in the instant case
helps alleviate these risks of the contracting parties. A party who has bargained for

111. Id.
112. Henry C. Strickland, The FederalArbitrationAct's Interstate Commerce Requirement: What's
Leftfor State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 400 (1992) (citing GABRIEL M. WILNER,
DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 28 & app. 1(1991)).
113. Id.at 460 n.93.
114. Id. at 400. The "old common law rule" is that "all pre-dispute arbitration agreements are void
as against public policy." Id. at 460 n.93.
115. Id. at 400.
116. Weston Sec. Corp. v. Aykanian, 703 N.E.2d 1185, 1189 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
117. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984).
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the right to arbitrate will not be usurped by the other, party to the arbitration
agreement simply seeking relief in the judicial system before the arbitration award
is given. The holding will increase the use of arbitration by parties who want their
disputes remedied by a more expedient mechanism than the judicial system. Parties
can have faith that arbitration will occur without the added delay of a judicial appeal.
In effect, each party will either get the benefit of its bargain (being able to arbitrate)
or be held to its bargain (being forced to arbitrate rather than use the judicial system).
The likely result is that contracting parties will more readily place arbitration clauses
in their contracts because they will be secure in knowing that the court will not allow
use of judicial proceedings when there is such a clause.
The courts, by creating pro-arbitration common law, have helped to further
Congress' policy favoring arbitration and the instant decision continues the trend.
Beginning with the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Moses,"8
the courts have curtailed a state's ability to erect anti-arbitration statutes to defeat the
enforcement of arbitration agreements. These rulings have helped ensure that parties
to an arbitration agreement cannot escape arbitration by selecting the forum to
dispute arbitrability. That is, if the courts would not have continually upheld the
F.A.A.'s pre-emption power, parties would be able to obtain different results
depending on whether the suit was brought in federal or state court. This would
reward and encourage parties to forum-shop, and, therefore, the better rule is to
provide contracting parties the same remedy in any forum." 9 The courts have
removed any motivation to forum-shop as state anti-arbitration laws are pre-empted
by the F.A.A. and other courts have enacted pro-arbitration laws. The strong case
law behind the F.A.A. has served to further the federal policy of the F.A.A. by
encouraging states to be pro-arbitration and in the same respect has alleviated any
potential forum-shopping. The instant decision correctly falls within this great line
of legal history, and its decision encourages the enforcement of arbitration when
parties have agreed to do so. The Massachusetts decision will not only serve to
further arbitration in Massachusetts, but when another state court faces this issue, the
Massachusetts' decision will point the court in the right direction.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Massachusetts Court of Appeals made the correct decision in Weston, as it
found that the Massachusetts' state law, though in conflict with the F.A.A., would
not be pre-empted by it. It made its decision by looking at the policy behind the
F.A.A. and to other cases that had dealt with the pre-emption issue. By finding that
its law, which does not allow an appeal before an arbitration award has been given,
was not pre-empted, the court added this case to a long line of cases which
encourage the federal policy of enforcing arbitration agreements.
SUZANNE H. JOHNSON

118. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
119. Id. at 15.
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